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Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence
and Stevedore Immunities
under the 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's Act
By David W. Robertson*

Prior to major changes effective November 27, 1972,' the jurisprudence
under the 1927 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 2
had developed a well-defined system for dealing with injuries to employees
covered by that statute. Three entities are routinely involved in such injuries: the vessel in connection with which the victim was working at the
time of his injury; the independent contractor hired by the vessel to load,
unload, repair, or perform some other service to the vessel; and the injury
victim himself, who is an employee of the independent contractor. It is
customary to refer to these three entities as "shipowner," "stevedore," and
"longshoreman," respectively. These terms are imprecise, because in
many instances the injured employee will be some other kind of maritime
worker than a longshoreman, such as a ship's repairman. In such instances,
of course, the independent contractor who is the victim's employer will not
be a "stevedore" but some other kind of maritime employer. Furthermore,
the vessel itself may be sued in tort in rem, and it may be in the control
of a charterer or other operator rather than the actual owner. But the terms
"longshoreman," "stevedore" and "shipowner" are commonly used in the
decisions and other literature in the sense used here: to refer to any covered
employee, his employer, and the tort defendant.
The longshoreman prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments3
was an exceedingly well-situated injury victim. He had relatively liberal
workmen's compensation rights against the stevedore (or the stevedore's
compensation carrier, who, for all purposes of this paper, may be equated
with the stevedore). Under the terms of the Longshoremen's Act, he could
* Baker and Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas. Louisiana State University
(B.A., 1960; LL.B., 1961); Yale University (LL.M., 1965; J.S.D., 1968).
1. Act of Oct, 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263, amending 33 U.S.C.A. §§901950. Section 22, 86 Stat. 1265, provided: "The amendments made by this Act shall become
effective thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act."
2. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. §§901-950 (1970).
3. The effective date of the amendments was November 27, 1972. See note 1, supra. The
amendments have no retroactive effect. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco Elev. Co.,
512 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975); McCawley v. Ozeanosun Compania, Maritime, S.A., 505 F.2d 26
(5th Cir. 1974).
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not sue his employer in tort, but in many instances he had a healthy tort
remedy against the shipowner through the warranty of seaworthiness.' The
shipowner frequently could shift the entire tort liability onto the stevedore
on the basis of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance, 5 despite
express language in the Longshoremen's Act stating that "the liability of
an employer [for workemen's compensation] shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages for such employer . . . on
account of such injury."'
The 1972 amendments made two fundamental changes in this system.
First, the longshoreman's action against the shipowner on the basis of the
warranty of seaworthiness was eliminated, which left a cause of action
based upon the shipowner's negligence. 7 Second, the right of the shipowner
to shift tort liabilities onto the stevedore was completely eliminated.'
Other major changes effected by the 1972 amendments were the liberalization of compensation benefits," expansion of the Act's geographic coverage, 0 and the inauguration of a new system of adjudication for disputed
compensation cases."
The most difficult question left to the courts under the 1972 amendments is the nature and content of the negligence action longshoremen
may bring against shipowners. The Act itself is not specific, but the
4. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), and progency; G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 438-441 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
5. See Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)
and progeny; GILMORE & BLACK 442-448.
6. 33 U.S.C.A. §905 (Supp. 1976).
7. The new 33 U.S.C,A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976) provides in part: "In the event of injury to
a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,
or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action
against such vessel. . . .The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based
upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The
remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel
except remedies available under this chapter."
8. The new 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976) provides in part: "[Tihe employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or
warranties to the contrary shall be void."
9. See 33 U.S.C.A. §906 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
10. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§902(3), 902 (4), 903 (Supp. 1976). See also notes 17-48, infra, and
accompanying text.
11. Under the amendments, compensation claims are heard in the first instance by administrative law judges. 33 U.S.C.A. §§919(d), 921(b)(1), 921(b)(3) (Supp. 1976). Decisions
of the administrative law judges are reviewed by the Benefits Review Board, a three-member
"quasi-judicial" body within the Department of Labor. 33 U.S.C.A. §921(b)(1) (Supp. 1976);
20 C.F.R. §801.103 (1976). Decisions of the Benefits Review Board are appealable to the
courts of appeals. Before the 1972 amendments, there was no administrative review procedure
for Longshoremen's Act claims. Cases were heard in the first instance by Deputy Commissioners of Labor, and review was then had in the federal district courts.
12. See note 7, supra.
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legislative history is unusually potent. The Senate" and House" Committee Reports are identical. Both state that
the purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a
vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime
employment ashore . . . . The Committee intends that on the one hand
an employee injured on board a vessel shall be in no less favorable position
vis-a-vis his rights against the vessel. . . than an employee who is injured
on land, and on the other hand, that the vessel shall not be liable . . .
unless it is proven to have acted or have failed to act in a negligent manner
such as would render a land-based 5third party in non-maritime pursuits
liable under similar circumstances.'
The reports make clear that a uniform federal negligence law is envisioned.
[T]he Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy ....
shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the
State . . . . The Committee intends that legal questions which may arise
in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined
as a matter of Federal law.15
In the bulk of the reported cases of longshoremen suing shipowners in
negligence under the 1972 amendments, those portions of the legislative
history have proved to be significant barriers against recovery. Case after
case cites or quotes the committee reports in support of a "land-based"
standard, supplies such a standard out of general tort law sources, and
finds that the shipowner is negligence-free under it. A major portion of this
paper will analyze that jurisprudence.
Other questions that have provoked significant litigation under the
amendments include: the coverage of the new statute for purposes of compensation rights; the impact, if any, of the amendments on the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts; and the scope of the new express prohibition against recovery over by shipowners against stevedores. Section I of
this paper will analyze the two "jurisdiction" questions: (1) With respect
to the availability of Longshoremen's Act workmen's compensation from
the stevedore, what is the scope of the amended Act's coverage? (2) What
effect has expansion of the Act's coverage had upon admiralty's tort jurisdiction. Section II will analyze the reported cases bearing on the content
of the longshoreman's negligence action against the shipowner. Section III
will sketch the present law on the meaning of the new Act's prohibition
against recovery over by shipowners against stevedores.
13. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as "S. REP."l.
14. H.R. REP. No. 92-1141, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 46984720 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
15. S. REP. 10-11; H.R. REP. 4703-4704.
16.

S. REP. 12; H.R. REP. 4705.
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AMENDMENTS

Coverage of the Amended Act

The principal limitation' 7 on the coverage of the pre-1972 Longshoremen's Act was geographic. Section 903(a) provided: "Compensation shall
be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States. . . ."Is in Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson," the Supreme Court adhered strictly to the navigable
waters limitation, holding that the Longshoremen's Act did not extend its

coverage to longshoremen hurt on piers, even though those same employees
were within the admiralty jurisdiction for purposes of their tort suits
against vessels involved in their injuries.
The 1972 amendments effectively removed the navigable waters limitation. As amended, §903(a) now provides for compensation of disability of

death results from injury "occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by
an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)." 0 This
expansion of the Act's geographical coverage has been liberally construed
by the administrative organs2' and courts of appeals"2 that have considered
it, and it is fair to say that relatively few longshoremen have difficulty with
that portion of the amended statute.
However, the 1972 amendments added a status limitation, not present
in the Act prior to the amendments. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the
Act defined a covered employee only as follows: "The term 'employee' does
not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net."23 The 1972 amendments injected a potentially significant limitation by adding to that definition of "employee", so that it now
reads: "The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in long17. The pre-1972 Act also conditioned the availability of Longshoremen's Act compensation on the circumstance that "recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." 33 U.S.C.A. §903(a) (1970).
This limitation provoked a oaeeive amount of jurisprudence, including the entire "twilight
zone" invention. See generally D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 202-221, 304-318
(1970). The limitation "may not validly be provided by State law" was rendered defunct in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), and the 1972 amendments removed
that language.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. §930(a) (1970).
19. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
20. 33 U.S.C.A. §903(a) (Supp. 1976).
21. See note 11, supra.
22. See note 11, supra, and notes 31-42, infra, and accompanying text.
23. 33 U.S.C.A. §902(3) (1970).
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shoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or
member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to
load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net." 4
In summary, the 1972 amendments greatly expanded the geographical
coverage of the Act, by stating that the basic coverage term "navigable
waters of the United States" shall be taken to include "any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel." 2 While this change greatly liberalized the Act's reach,
a conservative note was added when the covered employee was for the first
time defined as "any person engaged in maritime employment, including
any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker.
...26
Under the amended Act, contested compensation claims are heard in the
first instance by administrative law judges, whose decisions are appealable
to a three-member Benefits Review Board and thence to the courts of
appeals.27 According to one source,28 there have been at least thirty-two
Benefits Review Board decisionsl dealing with the coverage provisions of
the amended statute. Not surprisingly, both the administrative law judges
and the Benefits Review Board tend to resolve doubtful cases in favor of
coverage under the Act. The really meaningful definition of the Act's coverage is going to have to come from the courts of appeals.
At this writing, there are just two significant court of appeals decisions
on the question of the amended Act's coverage, 3 and they are at odds in
their reading of the statute. Neither court was in doubt about the coverage
of the injuries under the amended Act's situs requirement.3' In each case
24. 33 U.S.C.A. §902(3) (Supp. 1976) (The italicized language is that added by the 1972
amendments.)
25. 33 U.S.C.A. §903(a) (Supp. 1976).
26. 33 U.S.C.A. §902(3) (Supp. 1976).
27. See note 11. supra.
28. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080, 1092 (4th Cir.
1975) (Craven, J., dissenting).
29. The decisions of the administrative law judges, the Benefits Review Board and the
Courts of Appeals are all collected in a new three-volume looseleaf Benefits Review Board
Service (Matthew-Bender 1975) [hereinafter cited as B.R.B.S.].
30. Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 4 B.R.B.S. 156 (2d Cir. July 1, 1976);
I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975). According
to the opinion in Pittson, the LT.O. case has been reheard en banc by the Fourth Circuit
Court. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that a
sawmill pondman, engaged in sorting logs that arrived at the pond by water, was not in
maritime employment. Certiorari has been applied for. More recent coverage cases include
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), and Stockman v. John
T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976).
31. See Pittson, 4 B.R.B.S. at 179; I.TO., 529 F.2d at 1083-1084.
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the meaningful issue was the new "maritime employment" requirement.
Three claimants were involved in I. T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits
2
Review Board."
One was injured while moving cargo from its storage place
in a warehouse to a waiting delivery truck. The cargo had been removed
from a vessel to the warehouse seven days earlier. The other two claimants
were involved in a series of operations leading to the placement of containerized cargo aboard a vessel. One man moved cargo by forklift from
storage places in a warehouse to a container for stuffing. The other drove
a "hustler," a kind of truck moving the stuffed containers from the warehouse to a marshalling area adjacent to the pier. Reversing the administrative law judges and Benefits Review Board in each case, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while these employees fell within
the "situs" test of the amended Act," they were not engaged in "maritime
employment." Recognizing the elasticity of that term, the Court found in
the legislative history of the 1972 amendments a basis for concluding that
a "point of rest ' 3 test was intended. In the case of cargo coming off a
vessel, "the Act applies between the ship and . . .the first storage or
' 35
holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters.
In the case of cargo being loaded, "coverage is afforded from the last
storage or holding area on the pier, etc., to the ship. '3 6 Since the first
claimant was injured landward of the first point of rest, and the other two
claimants landward of the last point of rest, none of them was covered.
I.T.O. constitutes a fairly limiting reading of the "maritime employment" provision of the amended Act. There was a vigorous dissent, 7 and
38
the Court has reheard the case en banc.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly disagrees with the
39
Fourth Circuit's approach. In Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v.Dellaventura,
the court considered the claims of four longshoremen, each injured at some
point landward of the first (or last) point of rest. Two of the cases were
disposed of on grounds unrelated to the Act's coverage. In the third case,
a checker had been hurt while checking cargo being removed from a container at a pier to which it had been taken by truck through city streets
after coming off a vessel a few days earlier. In the fourth, a longshoreman
had been hurt inside the consignee's truck as he helped the driver load
32. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975). According to the opinion in Pittson, 4 B.R.B.S. at 159,
the Fourth Circuit has reheard IT.O. en banc. No en bane decision has been announced.
33. 529 F.2d at 1083-1084.
34. Id.at 1087.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Judge Craven vehemently dissented from the "point of rest" test. He concluded that
it was inappropriate to look into the legislative history when the statute was adequately clear
on the point; that the legislative history did not support the "point of rest" test, and that
the "point of rest" test was inappropriate as a matter of policy. 529 F.2d at 1089-1101.
38. See note 30, supra.
39. 4 B.R.B.S. 156 (2d Cir., July 1, 1976).
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cargo at the terminal at least five days after the cargo had been taken from
the vessel and stored. Once again, the Act's situs test was clearly met,40
and the issue was "maritime employment." In a lengthy and careful opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that "the
Amendments at least cover all persons meeting the situs requirements (1)
who are engaged in stripping or stuffing containers, or (2) are engaged in
the handling of cargo up to the point Where the consignee has actually
begun its movement from the pier (or in the case of loading, from the time
when the consignee has stopped his vehicle at the pier), provided in the
latter instances that the employee has spent a significantpart of his time
in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel. "41
Except for the italicized caveat, the Second Circuit Court states a clear,
liberal and workable test for coverage under the Act. Its decision seems
greatly preferable to the grudging approach of the Fourth Circuit. But, as
the court stated in Pittson, "given the importance of the question, the
number of court of appeals endeavoring to find an answer, and the divergence of opinion already manifested, it seems unlikely that the opinion of
any court of appeals will be the last word to be said."4
It seems likely that eventually Congress or the Supreme Court42 will
have to clear up the confusion implicit in the 1972 amendments' addition
of the "maritime employment" language. Some coverage questions under
the amendments are being readily handled. The decisions have had little
difficulty in concluding that employees engaged in extensive ship repair 3
or alteration, 4 ship construction, 5 and the like are expressly covered under
the amended Act. Similarly, it has been thought clear that non-seamen on
barges engaged in offshore oil operations in state waters are covered,46 as
well as such dockside workers as board of trade inspectors. 7 Aside from the
difficulties presented by the "maritime employment" language for the on40. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 159.
42.1. Certiorari has been granted in Pittson, sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, No. 76-444, and International Terminal Operating Co. v. Blundo, No. 76-454. 45
U.S.L.W. 3416 (Dec. 7, 1976).
43. See Cartwright v. Neptune Maritime Co., 1976 A.M.C. 474 (E.D. Va. 1975).
44. See Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 375 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
45. See DiLorenzo v. Robert E. Lee, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. La. 1976).
46. See St. Julien v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 403 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. La. 1975). In
several cases, the administrative law judges have determined that oil workers on fixed platforms in state waters fail the "maritime employment" test. See Neal v. Wilson Wireline
Services, 2 B.R.B.S. 88(ALJ) (1975); Henning v. Vacco Wireline Service, 2 B.R.B.S. 87(ALJ)
(1975); Wiley v. Wilson Wireline Services, 2 B.R.B.S. 86 (ALJ) (1975). For offshore oil operations on the outer continental shelf, there is no question, because the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act expressly adopts the Longshoremen's Act as the applicable compensation statute.
43 U.S.C.A. §133(c) (1970).
47. See Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La. 1974).
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going cargo handling operations, the jurisprudence is consistent, expansive, and clear."'
B.

Impact of the Amendments on Admiralty's Tort Jurisdiction

Before the 1972 amendments the jurisdictional picture for waterfront
injuries could be constructed on the basis of two United States Supreme
Court decisions. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson" involved workers
injured on piers by ship's equipment. One question might have been
whether these workers were within the admiralty jurisdiction for purposes
of any tort action they might seek to bring against the vessels whose equipment contributed to their injuries. Under the general maritime jurisprudence, admiralty tort jurisdiction depended upon occurrence of the injury
upon navigable water; under the concomitant principle that piers and the
like count as land, there would have been no admiralty jurisdiction. However, in 1948 Congress had passed the Admiralty Extension Act, 0 extending admiralty's tort jurisdiction over "all cases of damage or injury. . .caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such
damage or injury be done or consummated on land." Because the
Nacirema workers were hurt by ship's cranes, there would have been admiralty jurisdiction over their tort actions against the shipowners under the
Admiralty Extension Act.
The question confronted by the Supreme Court in Nacirema was not the
existence of admiralty jurisdiction over such tort suits, but the availability
of Longshoremen's Act compensation against the stevedores who employed
the injured workers. Because the Longshoremen's Act then confined its
coverage to "navigable waters of the United States,"5" the Court concluded
that there was no coverage under that Act. Recognizing that the Admiralty
Extension Act did afford tort jurisdiction over these same injuries, the
Court adhered to the view that the Longshoremen's Act defines its own
coverage, and that coverage under the Longshoremen's Act is not necessar48. It is not yet clear whether the longshoreman has the option to seek state workmen's
compensation when he is injured within the coverage of the amended Longshoremen's Act
but in an area which, before 1972, was clearly appropriate for state workmen's compensation.
The decisions are tending toward an affirmative answer. See Umbehagen v. Equitable Equip.
Co., 329 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1976) (employee injured while engaged in barge assembly inside
fabrication building sought Louisiana workmen's compensation apparently on the view that
it contains more liberal standards than the Longshoremen's Act on determining total disability; held, state workmen's compensation available); Poche v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 329
So. 2d 211 (La. App. 1976) (employee engaged in ship construction can still seek Louisiana
workmen's compensation but cannot use the provisions of Louisiana law permitting a tort
action against executive officers of the employer, because 33 U.S.C.A. §933(i) constitutes a
federal preemption on that point. Louisiana law has subsequently been amended to preclude
executive officer suits).
49. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
50. 46 U.S.C.A. §740 (1975).
51. 33 U.S.C.A. §903(a) (1970).
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ily as extensive as is the reach of admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Thus, under the Nacirema decision, there was a class of workers who had
access to the admiralty jurisdiction (and hence to the general maritime
law) for purposes of their tort rights against shipowners, but who were
confined to state workmen's compensation statutes for purposes of their
compensation rights against their employers.
In the other important pre-1972 decision, Victory Carriers,Inc. v. Law, 2
the Supreme Court kept that class of workers fairly small by holding that
there is no admiralty jurisdiction under the Admiralty Extension Act over
injuries to longshoremen on piers caused by pier-based equipment. The
prior Admiralty Extension Act jurisprudence might have been thought to
support the view that an injury was "caused by a vessel" in the Admiralty
Extension Act sense whenever the vessel's presence at the dock and need
for loading, unloading, or other services contributed to the injury. 53 But the
Victory Carriers decision established that the Admiralty Extension Act
does not reach such injuries unless they were caused by a physical appurtenance of the ship."
Thus, before 1972, longshoremen hurt on piers had no Longshoremen's
Act rights against their employers. Some of these longshoremen, however-those who were hurt by physical appurtenances of vessels-could
bring a maritime tort action against shipowners. Others were remitted to
state law for purposes of both tort and compensation rights. For several
reasons this jurisdictional allocation was less than satisfactory. Consider
three hypothetical longshoremen, working for the same stevedore, engaged
in unloading the same vessel, injured on the same day. Longshoreman A,
hurt in the hold of the ship, had Longshoremen's Act rights against his
employer and a maritime tort action (including access to the liberal unseaworthiness doctrine) against the shipowner. Longshoreman B, hurt on the
pier by the ship's crane, had to seek workmen's compensation from his
employer under state law, but he did have access to admiralty's tort
jurisdiction, hence the general maritime law, hence the unseaworthiness
doctrine. Longshoreman C, hurt on the pier by pier-based equipment, had
only state workmen's compensation rights against his employer and state
tort rights against the shipowner. Aside from the apparent inequities of
treatment among three employees doing the same job and undergoing
approximately the same risks, the situation of Longshoreman B presented
additional difficulties for the legal system. The maritime tort law would
seem to govern all aspects of his tort action against the shipowner. On the
other hand, most state workmen's compensation statutes contain provi52. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
53. See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
54. See Kinsella v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1975); Garrett
v. Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974); Mascuilli v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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sions dealing with tort actions against third parties by injured employees.
The potential for conflict between federal and state law was evident.
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act cleared up these problems, but may have created another. Under the 1972 amendments' expansion of the "navigable waters" limitation to include "any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel," 5 there would seem to be no instances where admiralty
tort jurisdiction is available but Longshoremen's Act compensation is not.
It appears, in fact, that the 1972 amendments may have created a problem
of precisely the opposite sort: Under the expanded "navigable waters"
language of the Act, there may be instances of coverage under the Longshoremen's Act for injuries that do not fall within the tort jurisdiction of
admiralty under the Victory Carriersreading of the Admiralty Extension
Act. Indeed, unless Victory Carriers has been altered by the 1972 amendments or in some other fashion, that outcome appears likely. There will
be any number of longshoreman injuries within the new Act's coverage
which do not meet the Victory Carriersjurisdictional requirement of having been caused by a physical appurtenance of the ship.
Consider the situation of the claimant in Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura.56 He was injured inside the cargo consignee's truck while
helping load the truck with cargo that had come off a vessel and been
stored in a warehouse several days earlier. Under the decision in Pittson,
that claimant is entitled to the benefits of the Longshoremen's Act against
his employer.17 But by no stretch of the imagination could the claimant in
Pittson meet the jurisdictional requirements set up in Victory Carriers.
Under the teaching of that case, his tort action would have to be brought
in state court under state law. Yet the 1972 Longshoremen's Act contains
express provisions purporting to govern tort actions by longshoremen
against shipowners. The problem presented by the 1972 amendments thus
is whether Victory Carrierscontinues to remit such an action to state law,
or whether it is to be governed by the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act
dealing with negligence actions by longshoremen against shipowners.
It seems fairly obvious that it would be desirable to include such a
claimant's tort action against the shipowner within the admiralty jurisdiction, the maritime law, and hence the provisions of the amended Longshoremen's Act. Several avenues of argument suggest themselves for
achieving that result.
First, it might be determined that the 1972 amendments constitute a
congressional extension of admiralty jurisdiction-either by implicit alteration of the Admiralty Extension Act or by explicit alteration of the mean55.
56.
57.

33 U.S.C.A. §903(a) (Supp. 1976).
4 B.R.B.S. 156 (2d Cir., July 1, 1976).
See notes 39-42, supra, and accompanying text.
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ing of "navigable waters"-so that Victory Carriersis no longer good law.
Several reported decisions since the 1972 amendments make assumptions
that are against that approach.5" Others seem to assume without useful
discussion that the Victory Carriers limitation was removed by the 1972
amendments. 9 Only two reported decisions contain explicit treatment of
the issue. In Swans v. United States Lines Inc.," ° a longshoreman injured
on the pier while attaching a container to an allegedly defective trailer
frame brought a negligence action against the shipowner. The shipowner
sought indemnity or contribution from the stevedore under state law, contending that, under Victory Carriers,the matter was outside the admiralty
jurisdiction and therefore outside the reach of the amended Longshoremen's Act prohibition against recovery over by shipowners against stevedores. 6' The federal district court rejected that argument, stating:
The holding in Victory Carriers must be read in light of the effect of the
1972 amendments. . . . The legislative history of these amendments illuminates the Congressional intent to extend the reach of the LHWCA to a
longshoreman's land-based injury. . . . The 1972 amendments. . . have
effectively eviscerated Victory Carriers and its progeny."2
In a fuller treatment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion. The plaintiff truck-driver in Parker v. South
Louisiana Contractors,Inc. 13 was transported with his truck by barge to a
delivery site. Prior to driving off the barge onto a metal ramp that was
lowered from the land to the barge, plaintiff was hurt while walking over
the ramp. After concluding that there was no admiralty jurisdiction under
the traditional locality test and none under the Victory Carriersreading
of the Admiralty Extension Act, the court turned to plaintiff's argument
that the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act should be read as
extending admiralty jurisdiction to his injury:
Essentially, [plaintiff's] contention seems to be that in view of [the]
broadened coverage [of the amended Long horemen's Act], it necessarily
follows that admiralty jurisdiction with regards to third party claims such
as his own had experienced a parallel widening. The fact that compensation coverage was expanded. . . , however, does not imply that admiralty
jurisdiction has been extended to embrace noncompensation claims
58. See Bennett v. Faircape Steamship Corp., 524 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1975); Brkaric v. Star
Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
59. See Pittson, 4 B.R.B.S. 156 (2d Cir. July 1, 1976). In discussing the constitutionality
of the extended coverage of the 1972 Longshoremen's Act, the court assumes that Congress
has "expand[ed] the concept of a maritime tort." See also Givens v. Prudential-Grace Lines,
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
60. 407 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
61. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976).
62. 407 F. Supp. at 391-392.
63. 537 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1976).
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brought by employees againstparties other than their employers. Indeed,
a careful reading of the provision of the 1972 Amendments governing third
party actions and the pertinent legislative history leads us to the opposite
conclusion."
The principal evidence in the amended Act and its legislative history
which the court found in support of its conclusion against the expansion
of tort jurisdiction was a "manifest purpose. . . to curtail rather than
expand the availability of third party actions in admiralty." 5 Thus, "the
boundaries of maritime jurisdiction as defined under prior law (e.g.,
Victory Carriers)were neither expanded nor constricted by passage of the
1972 Amendments, but simply retained." 6
This rejection by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the argument that
admiralty's tort jurisdiction was expanded by the 1972 amendments requires exploration of other avenues of approach to the desirable conclusion
that admiralty has tort jurisdiction over actions against shipowners by all
longshoremen covered under the amended Longshoremen's Act. The recent Supreme Court decision in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland 7 is potentially extremely important in this regard. Executive
Jet did not involve longshoremen or other maritime employees; it dealt
with the general subject of admiralty's tort jurisdiction. In that case, the
Court held that the owners of an airplane which encountered birds over a
waterfront airport and then crashed into Lake Erie could not maintain a
tort action against the airport personnel in admiralty, because, while the
tort may have occurred on navigable water,'6 it did not meet an essential
requirement of admiralty tort jurisdiction: that the matter bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.6 9
The jurisprudence dealing with the Executive Jet case has taken it as
standing for what is called "locality-plus;" 70 the prevailing interpretation
has been that the case means that (except as provided by the Admiralty
Extension Act) locality on navigable waters is a requisite for tort jurisdiction, but more is required. In the Parker case, before rejecting plaintiff's
argument that the 1972 Longshoremen's Act amendments expanded tort
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 116-117 (emphasis added).
Id.at 117.
Id.

67.

409 U.S. 249 (1972).

68. The district court in Executive Jet found no admiralty jurisdiction, both because the
tort lacked a significant relationship with traditional maritime activity and because it did
not occur on navigable water. 409 U.S. at 251-252. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed on the basis that the tort occurred on land, where the plane hit the birds. 448 F.2d
151, 154 (6th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide where the
tort occurred. 409 U.S. at 267.
69. 409 U.S. at 268.
70. See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973); Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d
840 (4th Cir. 1973).

19771

LONGSHOREMEN'S A CT

jurisdiction to cover his injury,7' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that there was no general admiralty jurisdiction because of the
traditional view that tort jurisdiction depends upon locality; the court
concluded in a footnote that Executive Jet made "the test for admiralty
7
jurisdiction even more stringent than it was under the locality test alone."
But there isa better way to read the Executive Jet case-a way that
provides a suitable approach to the problem presented by the fact that
Longshoremen's Act coverage under the 1972 amendments is apparently
broader than admiralty's tort jurisdiction. Executive Jet should be read,
not as requiring locality plus a significant connection with traditional maritime activity for tort jurisdiction, but as meaning that tort jurisdiction no
longer depends upon locality. The new test for tort jurisdiction would
simply be whether the matter bears a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity, with location of the injury merely an evidentiary point.
Under the suggested reading of the decision, any longshoreman, covered
for purposes of his compensation rights against his employer by the
amended Longshoremen's Act, would be within admiralty's tort jurisdiction because of his significant connection with traditional maritime activity.
This is not a strained or brutalizing reading of the Executive Jet decision. It finds support in the first section of Justice Stewart's opinion for
the unanimous Court, 71 which thoroughly discredits the locality test, not
only because it has led to the inclusion in admiralty of many matters which
sensible policy would have excluded," but also because it has excluded
many matters from the admiralty which sensible policy would have included. 75 If the locality test does not work because it is often underinclusive
as well as over-inclusive, then Executive Jet ought to be taken as holding
that locality is no more an unvarying requisite than it is an inevitable sufficiency. Under this approach, a longshoreman's suit against a shipowner
would be within the admiralty jurisdiction, not on some adventuresome
reading of the 1972 amendments or the "caused by a vessel" language in
the Admiralty Extension Act, but on the straightforward view that the
longshoreman is engaged in traditional maritime activity.
Although the suggested reading of the Executive Jet case is available on
the opinion of the Court it is a distinctly minority view at present." Until
this or some other answer is found by the courts, there will apparently be
frequent recurrence of the situation presented in Parker-theinjury victim
71. See notes 63-66, supra, and accompanying text.
72. 537 F.2d 113, 115 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
73. 409 U.S. at 253-261.
74. Id. at 256-258.
75. Id. at 259-261.
76. The suggested interpretation of Executive Jet was mentioned in Judge Morgan's
dissent in Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 527 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1973). It was urged in Robertson,
Book Review, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 352, 363-365 (1976). No other support has been found.
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is covered by the Longshoremen's Act for his compensation rights against
his employer, but his tort rights against third parties, including shipowners, are beyond the reach of the admiralty jurisdiction and the maritime
law.
II.

NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS BY LONGSHOREMEN AGAINST SHIPOWNERS

Before the 1972 amendments, the only language in the Longshoremen's
Act affecting the longshoreman's tort action against the shipowner was the
general statement that when the longshoreman "determines that some
person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is
liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive . . . compensation
or to recover damages against such third person."7 That the shipowner was
a "third person" who could be sued in tort by the longshoreman, and that
the longshoreman was entitled to claim both negligence and unseaworthiness against the shipowner, were case-law developments."
As amended in 1972, the Act explicitly provides for the longshoreman's
tort action against the shipowner. The new §905(b) states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by
the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled
to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such
vessel . . . .The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be
based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time
the injury occurred."
Thus, it is clear from the statute itself that the longshoreman has lost his
unseaworthiness rights against the shipowner, but retains a negligence
action. What the statute leaves unclear is the nature of that negligence
action. A straightforward reading of the statutory language would suggest
that the content of the longshoreman's negligence action should continue
to be determined by the law of the admiralty cases wherein longshoremen
sued shipowners in negligence. 80 Instead, the decisions have seized upon
77. 33 U.S.C.A. §933(a) (1970). The language of this subsection was unchanged by the
1972 amendments.
78. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 408-411; Robertson, Negligence Actions by
Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. 447 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].

79. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976).
80. Most of those cases would probably have been decided prior to Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), which gave longshoremen the right to sue on the basis of
unseaworthiness. Once the unseaworthiness doctrine was available to longshoremen, shipowner negligence became a decidedly secondary concern, since the unseaworthiness remedy
would avail in virtually all cases of negligence as well as in many cases in which there was
no shipowner negligence. See discussion in Robertson, supra note 78, at 450-452.
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language in the Senate", and House" committee reports accompanying the
1972 amendments to the effect that issues of shipowner negligence must
be
resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the
ordinary process of litigation-just as they are in cases involving alleged
negligence by land-based third parties. The Committee intends that on
the one hand an employee injured on board a vessel shall be in no less
favorable position vis a vis his rights against the vessel as a third party
than is an employee who is injured on land, and on the other hand, that
the vessel shall not be liable as a third party unless it is proven to have
acted or have failed to act in a negligent manner such as would render a
land-based third party in non-maritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances. a3
Undue emphasis on this call for development of a body of shipowner
negligence law by analogy to "land-based" occupier's liability principles
has entailed some confusion about the theoretical nature of the cause of
action under the new §905(b). The Longshoremen's Act is predicated upon
congressional power derived from the admiralty grant' and therefore has
always been thought of as a statutory part of the maritime law of the
United States. Yet one district judge has found a technical jurisdictional
defect in a longshoreman's negligence complaint alleging that the action
arose under "General Maritime Law." 5 Another, without explanation,
held a longshoreman's negligence action removable to federal court as a
"civil action . . .arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce."" While the matter is mainly a highly theoretical one, the question
of the underlying nature of the §905(b) action does relate in a significant
way to the standard of care owed by the shipowner. "If the new §905(b) is
read to create a federally uniform, land-based standard of care owed by
shipowners to longshoremen, it seems to amount to a new federal statutory
creation, and thus ought to be removable. . . as involving a federal question. If, on the other hand, the new §905(b) simply leaves the longshoreman with what he has long had, a maritime negligence caution, then the
new §905(b) creates no new cause of action, and the suit is one based on
the general maritime law and is therefore not removable." 7 On the view
81. See note 13, supra.
82. See note 14, supra.
83. S. REP. at 11; H.R. REP. at 4704.
84. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Norfolk, Baltimore and Carolina Lines,
Inc. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 45 U.S.L.W. 2127 (4th Cir., Aug. 6, 1976).
85. DiLorenzo v. Robert E. Lee, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (E.D. La. 1976).
86. See Arena v. Maritime Company of Philippines, 1974 A.M.C. 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
holding the action removable on the basis of the quoted statute, 28 U.S.C.A. §1337 (1976).
87. Robertson, supra note 78, at 458. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354 (1959), holds that cases arising under the general maritime law do not arise
under federal law in the sense necessary for federal question jurisdiction, nor, consequently,
in the sense necessary for removal.
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developed later in this article, that the longshoreman's negligence action
ought to be governed by the general maritime law, the decisions holding
the new §905(b) action not removable"' are highly preferable as a matter
of jurisdictional theory. 9
The legislative history's call for development of a body of shipowner
negligence law by analogy to the general land-based law of occupier's liability has proved burdensome to plaintiffs in many of the reported decisions under the new §905(b).10 Almost all of this body of jurisprudence
consists of decisions of the federal district courts, so that the present preponderance of the case law in favor of shipowners is far from definitive. The
matter rather urgently awaits appellate court clarification. Still, at this
writing, the jurisprudence favors the shipowner. In a large number of the
decided cases wherein shipowners prevailed, the reported facts suggest
that there would probably have been no shipowner negligence under any
standard,9 so that the repeated references to the applicability of landbased law were dicta.2 But in other cases, the relevant portions of the
legislative history have been outcome-determinative. The following discussion will examine and criticize some of the principal features of the
body of decisions wherein the legislative history's provisions for reference
88. See Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Louissaint v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 1975 A.M.C. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
89. The connection between the nature of the cause of action and the content of the
negligence law standard shipowners now owe stevedores is more fully discussed in Robertson,
supra note 78, at 458-460.
90. For full discussion of all the negligence cases available as of October 15, 1975, see
Robertson, supra note 78.
91. See Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975); Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde Fyffes
Group, Ltd., 509 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975); Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc., 409 F. Supp. 869
(E.D. La. 1976); Johnson v. Zenith Navigation Co., No. 74-1502 (E.D. La., Feb. 10, 1975);
Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., No. 74-115 (M.D. La., October 21, 1975); Citizen
v. M/V Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974); DeLoatch v. American President Lines,
1975 A.M.C. 674 (E.D. Va. 1974); Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974);
Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 375 F. Supp. 233, 380 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Tex. 1974);
Ramirez v. Toko Kaium K.K., 384 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Calif. 1974); White v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 1975 A.M.C. 191 (D. Md. 1974); Wood v. M/V Aristoteles, 1975 A.M.C. 1057 (E.D. La.
1974).
92. But some of these dicta were quite harsh. See, e.g., Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc.,
409 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. La. 1976): "When a danger is open and obvious, the shipowner's
knowledge of such a danger is immaterial ....
" Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4,
7-8 (E.D. La. 1974): "ITlhe vessel had no actual knowledge of the particular hole into which
the plaintiff fell. Though the vessel's crew was aware that such holes were apt to develop in
the type of cargo involved, that sort of constructive knowledge imposed no duty upon the
vessel to remedy such defects or warn the longshoremen of them. . . . The hole which Fedison fell into was precisely the kind of defect which certainly could have been readily observed
by the plaintiff or his immediate superiors in the exercise of ordinary care." Hite v. Maritime
Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 227 (E.D. Tex. 1974): "[T]he drop cord that shocked the
plaintiff was in an open and obvious defective condition prior to the injury; therefore, the
defendant owed no duty to warn the plaintiff of said defective condition."
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to the land-based law have proved fatal to the longshoreman's negligence
3
suit against the shipowner.
A.

Cases Holding for the Shipowner

As a preliminary matter, it should be stressed that, while both the House
and Senate Committee reports accompanying the 1972 amendments indicate that the longshoreman's negligence action should be formulated from
occupiers' liability principles taken from the land-based law, 4 it is not
state law as such that is being suggested. Instead, both committee reports
call for a uniform federal standard: "[T]he Committee does not intend
that the negligence remedy authorized in the bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the State in which the port
may be located. The Committee intends that legal questions which may
arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined as a matter of federal law. ' ' 5 There is some incongruity in calling
for both land-based law and federal uniformity. The traditional and obvious source of a uniform body of federal law in these matters would be
the general maritime law; there is no federal law of occupiers' liability. The
call for federal uniformity has been detrimental to plaintiffs seeking recovery under specific state-law doctrines enhancing or further defining the
occupier's duties to invitees. For example, two cases 9 have rejected the
application of the stringent Oregon Employers' Liability Act 7 because
"[tihe OELA standard is higher than the traditional common law standard." ' It has been pointed out that
from the prospective plaintiff's point of view, it could be argued that the
defense interests are thus far having it both ways. The legislative history's
call for the application of land-based principles points to a more conservative body of doctrines than the general maritime law. The federal uniformity specification in the legislative history does have the virtue of making
explicit that assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not to bar
recovery. But otherwise the federal uniformity specification is an additional factor toward limiting the shipowner's duty, because only a relatively few states' laws yet contain the more recent emendations of the
occupier's duties. From the viewpoint of the plaintiff, something like a
lowest common denominator phenomenon seems to be at work."
93.

This matter is more fully discussed in Robertson, supra note 78, at 452-458, 460-476.

94.

See notes 81-83, supra, and accompanying text.

95. S. REP.; H.R. REP. at 4705.
96. Croshaw v. Koninsklijke Nedlloyd, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975); Birrer v. Flota
Mercante Grancolombiana, 386 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Ore. 1974).
97. O.R.S. 654.305-654.335 (1973).
98. Birrer,386 F. Supp. at 1107. See also Teofilovich v. d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific
Line, 415 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Calif. 1976); Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 1976
A.M.C. 808 (Cal. App. 1976).
99. Robertson, supra note 78, at 466.
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The most troublesome of the "land-based" doctrines that have vexed
longshoremen-plaintiffs has been something called the "open and obvious
danger" rule. Some of the courts applying that doctrine against longshoremen have been persuaded that, when a danger is known to or readily
discoverable by the stevedoring contractor or its employees, the shipowner's knowledge of the danger should not result in liability.1 ° The
following statement of the doctrine is typical of this group of decisions:
It is black-letter law that the owner of a premise owes no duty to warn an
invitee of a defect or danger which is known to him or which is as well
known to the invitee as to the owner, or which is obvious or which should
be observed by the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care."'
Under that view, the shipowner's knowledge of the danger is often irrelevant. A shipowner might, for example, come into port with a vessel presenting discoverable or known dangers at the time stevedoring operations
are commenced and still escape liability on a showing that the danger was
of the sort longshoremen should be expected to discover and remedy for
themselves." 2 Furthermore, when this version of the "open and obvious"
doctrine is taken to mean that the plaintiff's own knowledge of the danger
will suffice to insulate the shipowner from liability, it seems to be a "lefthanded" application of of the doctrine of assumption of risk, 103 which the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments specifically states is not to be
applied against longshoremen.'0 In a very important recent decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly relied upon the legislative history's prohibition of the assumption of risk doctrine in rejecting this
0 5
view of the "open and obvious" doctrine.'
In another group of cases where the "open and obvious danger" doctrine
prevented recovery, the courts stated and applied the doctrine with a
significant qualification. Acknowledging the legislative history's call for
reference to the land-based law, these courts have looked to the second
07
Restatement of Torts' 6 for "the modern view. . . of land-based law."'
100. See, e.g., Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4, 7 (E.D. La. 1974); Hite v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 380 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Ramirez v. Toko Kaium
K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Calif. 1974) (dictum).
101. 382 F. Supp. at 7.
102. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compania Generale Transatlantique, 1976 A.M.C. 476 (E.D.
Va. 1975); Sloan v. Deniz Nakliyatin, 1975 A.M.C. 236 (Fla. App. 1975).
103. For discussion of this point, see Robertson, supra note 78, at 474-475.
104. S. REP. at 12: "[Tlhe Committee intends that the admiralty rule which precludes
the defense of 'assumption of risk' in an action by an injured employee shall also be applicable." Identical language appears in H.R. REP. AT 4705.
105. Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir.
1976).
106. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) §343A(1) states: "A possessor of land is not liable
to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
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Under that "modern view," the shipowner will be liable for injuries produced by a "danger. . .known or obvious to the invitees, [if he] should
expect that they will not protect themselves against it or should otherwise
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."''0 Very recently the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor
of the shipowner because of the trial court's failure to apply the stated
qualification of the "open and obvious" doctrine.'00
Whether or not the "open and obvious" doctrine is qualified, it presents
a significant barrier to longshoremen in many of the recent decisions. One
such case is presently before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals," '0 and it
is hoped that court's decision will provide significant clarification. In
Guerra v. D/S, A/S Laly,' longshoremen had removed pallets from the
hold of the vessel and stored them in a dangerously high stack near an open
hatch. The plaintiff was hurt when the ship's crane, operated by a fellow
longshoreman, tipped one of the pallets into the hold. Exoneration of the
shipowner in the trial court was squarely based on the obviousness of the
danger: "The defendant shipowner was under no duty to warn the independent stevedoring contractor or his employees, including the plaintiff, of the
open and obvious danger which the independent contractor created aboard
the vessel and which was admittedly known and appeciated by the independent contractor's employees including the plaintiff."," The case thus
provides an excellent vehicle for discussion and eludication of the "open
and obvious" danger principle. As indicated above, two views have developed in the post-1972 decisional law with respect to the sweep of that
principle. On the more conservative and shipowner-oriented view, arguably taken by the trial court in Guerra, finding that the danger was obvious
closes the inquiry. The other view is more appealing, holding that under
such circumstances the shipowner might nevertheless have a duty to provide some kind of protection to a longshoreman who is evidently not being
despite such knowledge or obviousness." (Emphasis added.)
107. Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092, 1101 (D. Md. 1975). See
also Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp. Panama, 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (D. Md. 1975).
108. 394 F. Supp. at 1011.
109. 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
110. Guerra v. A/S, D/S Laly, No. 73-H-1559 (S.D. Tex., March 10, 1975), App. No. 752441, was scheduled for argument before the Fifth Circuit court on November 1, 1976. Two
other significant cases on the 1972 amendments were to be argued on the same day. Gay v.
Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., No. 75-1443 (S.D. Fla., March 21, 1975), App. No. 75-2729,
turned mainly on the applicability of the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring, 33
U.S.C.A. §941 (1970), 29 C.F.R. §§1910-1922 (1976). See discussion in Robertson, supra note
78, at 460-465, 475-476. Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, Nos. 74-599, 75-839 (E.D. La., Feb. 8,
1975), App. No. 75-1910, turned mainly on the question whether a longshoreman who is
directly employed by the shipowner may maintain a negligence action against the shipowner.
See discussion in Robertson, supra note 78, at 476-489; and see text accompanying notes 140149, infra.
111. No. 73-H-1559 (S.D. Tex., March 10, 1975).
112. Id. at 6.
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protected against the danger, obvious though it may be. The maritime bar
is anxiously awaiting the Guerra outcome.
B.

Cases Holding for the Plaintiff

Only two decision have been found that overtly resist the "land-based" 3
provisions of the legislative history. In Marrant v. Farrell Lines, Inc.,"1
plaintiff was injured in the vessel's hold when one or more bags of cocoa
beans fell on him. Plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial on a showing of improper stowage. Denying defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and a new trial, the court stated:
"The plaintiff has cited to the Court numerous pre- and post-Sieracki
decisions which stand for the proposition that the owner of a vessel owes
the stevedores engaged upon the vessel the duty of exercising reasonable
diligence to furnish a reasonably safe place in which to perform their
services. This Court is in complete accord with this proposition. We are
least persuaded that the test of the degree of care is that which a landbased owner of premises owes to a business invitee."14
Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co.," 5 holding that the longshoremen's
§905(b) action is based on the general maritime law and is hence not removable to federal court,"' ventures an explanation of the legislative history's call for land-based principles:
It seems more likely . . . that the language . . . is an indication that

Congress intended to clearly set out the standards. . . for maritime negligence for fear of what a court would do in the absence of language clearly
indicating that Congress wanted no more no-fault liability of the shipowner by whatever name it would be called by a court. .

.

. Congress

wanted to eliminate unseaworthiness for longshoremen and wanted to
prevent the same benefits of unseaworthiness from accruing to the longshoremen under a different name, that of "negligence." The language
[from the legislative history] . . . is more precisely seen as part of the

effort to do away with unseaworthiness than the effort to create a new
heretofore unknown remedy." 7
Two important decisions in favor of the longshoreman-plaintiff explicitly reject the unqualified "open and obvious" doctrine in favor of the
"modern" rule that imposes a duty on the shipowner to take corrective
action whenever it appears that, despite the danger's obviousness, the
113. 1976 A.M.C. 504 (E.D. Va. 1976).
114. Id.at 507.
115. 394 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
116. See notes 84-89, supra, and accompanying text; Robertson, supra note 78, at 458460.
117. 394 F. Supp. at 1193-1194 (emphasis added).
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longshoreman will be unable to avoid the danger."5 In Napoli v.
[Transpacific Carriers, Etc.] Hellenic Lines,"' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed a judgment for the shipowner because the trial
judge had failed to charge the jury as to this qualification of the "open and
obvious" doctrine. Plaintiff had slipped from some unsecured plywood
boards resting atop a deck load of drums because snow covered the drums
and plywood. The court stated that
there was evidence from which a jury might conclude that the ship should
reasonably have anticipated that Napoli would not be able to avoid the
danger despite its obviousness. The thrust of Napoli's testimony was that
he had to stand on the plywood in order to carry out his duties ....
Thus, it might be argued that if this was the only place for Napoli to work
and carry out his job, the vessel might reasonably anticipate that he would
use it despite its obvious danger .... "I
In Croshaw v. Koninslijke Nedlloyd,'I the vessel's deck block created an
obvious danger for which the shipowner was held responsible, on the theory
that
[clontrary to the traditional view, proof that the dangerous condition was
obvious or known to an invitee who realized the danger will not necessarily
absolve the shipowner from liability. If the shipowner "should anticipate
12
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness," he may be held liable.
The remaining cases favoring longshoremen-plaintiffs contain no significant discussion of the underlying theory.' 2 Under those decisions plaintiffs
were held entitled to recovery on showing that the shipowners were negligent with respect to ice and snow on the vessel's deck,'2 4 a tarpaulin left
unbattened by the vessel's crew,' 5 inadequate gear for lashing operations,'2 6 and oil thrown on the deck by the master of the vessel.'" In addi118. See notes 100-112, supra, and accompanying text.
119. 539 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
120. Id. at 509.
121. 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975).
122. Id. at 1230.
123. But see Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp. 712, 715 (W.D.
Wash. 1975), denying defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's allegation of a duty to provide
a safe place to work.
124. Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Toykyo, 1975 A.M.C. 1505 (D. Ore. 1974),
aff'd, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S.-,
96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976). As
predicted in Robertson, supra note 78, at 474 n.157, the Ninth Circuit Court did not deal with
the liability point but with the "recovery over" features of the case. See discussion infra in
the text accompanying notes 163-174.
125. Hubbard v. Great Pacific Shipping Co., 404 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975).
126. Shellman v. U.S. Lines Operators, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Calif. 1974), revd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. -. , 96 S. Ct. 1668
(1976).
127. DiLorenzo v. Robert E. Lee, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. La. 1976). See also Butler
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tion, one case held that a shipowner might be liable to a longshoreman
hurt by a specialized cargo-moving vehicle furnished by shipowner under
the theory of strict liability in tort for defective products, provided it could
be shown that the shipowner was "in the business of distributing the
allegedly defective product to the public."' 28
C.

Conclusion

The purposes of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act were
said by both the Senate and House committee reports to include the promotion of waterfront safety. In identical language, the reports state:
Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence will meet the
objective of encouraging safety. . . .Thus, nothing in this bill is intended
to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate corrective
action where it knows or should have known about a dangerous condition.
The Committee recognizes that progress has been made in reducing injuries in the longshore industry, but longshoring remains one of the most
hazardous types of occupations. The Committee expects to see further
progress in reducing injuries and stands ready to immediately reexamine
the whole third party suit question if it appears that the changes made in
present law by this bill have affected progress in improving occupational
health and safety."'
Under the decisions reading the legislative history's call for application of
land-based occupiers' liability principles as meaning that the shipowner is
not liable for any "open and obvious" dangers, it appears reasonably clear
that waterfront safety is being adversely affected. Surely it would be an
additional inducement to the safety of longshoring employees to require
that the shipowner turn over the vessel to the stevedore in reasonably safe
condition, and to warn or take other corrective action about hazardous
conditions that arise thereafter, whenever it would appear to the reasonable shipowner that longshoremen are endangered. Hence, it is to be hoped
that the decisions of the courts of appeals in cases under the 1972 amendments will manifest a less literal-minded attitude toward the legislative
history. The appellate courts should read the legislative history as a whole,
including its call for safety as a primary objective and its prohibition
against the assumption of risk and contributory negligence doctrines, and
conclude that the shipowner continues to owe the longshoreman a reasonably safe place to work under the general maritime law. The recent decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Napoli case' 0 is an
encouraging sign.
v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 537 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1976).
128. Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 935, 940 (C.D. Calif.
1975).
129. S. REP. at 10, 12; H.R. REP. at 4704-4705.
130. See notes 105, 109, 119 and 120, supra, and accompanying text.
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III.

STEVEDORE'S INSULATION FROM TORT LIABILITY

A.

Recovery By Shipowners Against Stevedores

The pre-1972 Longshoremen's Act provided in § 905 that the stevedore's
liability for workmen's compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee. . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer . . . on account of
such injury or death.' 3' On the strength of that provision, the Supreme
32
Court held in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.'
that the shipowner held liable to the injured longshoreman was not entitled
to contribution from the stevedore. There the matter should have rested.
But, four years after Halcyon, the Court decided Ryan Stevendoring Co.,
Inc. v. Pan-A tlantic Steamship Corp. 33 Without overruling Halcyon, the
Ryan case developed a warranty of workmanlike performance under which
the shipowner could recover indemnity from the stevedore when the latter
was responsible for the unseaworthy condition that formed the basis of
plaintiff's recovery against the shipowner. Under the Ryan decision, the
typical longshoreman's damage suit became the infamous "Ryan triangle," whereby the quoted provision of §905 was effective circumvented. The stevedore could not be held for contribution. Indeed, the recent decision of the Court in Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc. ' reiterates that the Halcyon prohibition against contribution
from the statutorily immune stevedore continues to be good law.'1 But
under the Ryan triangle the stevedore was quite routinely held for indemnity.
As amended in 1972, the Longshoremen's Act retains the provisions of
the former §905 as the new §905(a). 36 In addition, the amendments added
a new §905(b), which provides: "In the event of injury to a person covered
under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,
or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may
bring an action against such vessel as a third party . . . and the employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and
any agreements or warrantiesto the contrary shall be void." ' 3 The clear
intention of the 1972 statute is to overrule the Ryan doctrine. The legislative history reinforces that clarity,1'3 and the decisions under the 1972
amendments carry out the statutory intention. 39 Hence, it is now clear
131. 33 U.S.C.A. §905 (1970).
132. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
133. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
134. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).

135. Id. at 112-113.
136. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(a) (Supp. 1976).
137. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
138.

See S. REP. at 11; H.R. REP. at 4704.

139.

See Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 386 F. Supp. 1081

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

that the stevedore is completely insulated from any action for contribution
or indemnity brought by the shipowner.
B.

Compensation Act Employers Who Are Also Shipowners

A less clear provision in the 1972 amendments deals with the untypical
situation of the shipowner who employs his own longshoremen directly,
rather than engaging an independent stevedoring contractor. In this situation, the same entity is both shipowner and stevedore, and the question
arises whether he is subject to a tort suit by the injured longshoreman.
Under the pre-1972 Act, the decision in Ryan strongly implied that there
would be no serious barrier to tort liability of the shipowner/stevedore. If,
as was true under the Ryan triangle, the independent stevedoring contractor would frequently bear the entire tort liability via the shipowner's indemnity action, then it was but a small step to holding that the longshoreman could sue the shipowner/stevedore directly. The Supreme Court took
that step in Reed v. S. S. Yaka"" and Jackson v. Lykes Bros. Steamship
Co. 141

When the 1972 amendments overruled the Ryan decision and effectuated a full insulation of the independent contractor stevedore from damages liability on account of injury to the longshoreman, the issue of the
shipowner/stevedore's tort liability was naturally reopened. Congress could
sensibly have decided that, With the removal of the Ryan triangle and the
right of indemnification against the independent contractor stevedore,
there was no further warrant for making any Longshoremen's Act employer
liable for tort damages on account of injury to an employee, so that the
Reed and Jackson cases ought to be overruled.' Instead, Congress elected
to retain the doctrine of those two cases on the view that "the rights of an
injured longshoreman. . should not depend on whether he was employed
directly by the vessel or by an independent contractor. ' " 3 The preservation
of the Reed and Jackson result is rather clumsily effected in the statute.
A portion of the new §905(b) says:
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Meredith v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. La. 1976);
Givens v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Cartwright v.
Neptune Maritime Co., 1976 A.M.C. 474 (E.D. Va. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera
La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La. 1974).
140. 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (in rem action by longshoreman against vessel owned or chartered
by his employer).
141. 386 U.S. 371 (1967) (in personam action by longshoreman against stevedore/shipowner).
142. This is the position attributed to Congress by G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 450 (1975). This otherwise excellent treatise is weak on several features of the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's Act. See Robertson, supra note 78, at 449, 478; Robertson, Book Review, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 352, 365-369; Owen, Book Review 7 J. MAR. L. 736, 741742 (1976).
143. S. REP. at 11; H.R. REP. at 4705.
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If [the person bringing a negligence action against the vessel'"] was
employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons
engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such
action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of
persons engaged in providing ship building or repair services to the ves45
sel.
The statute would have been far clearer had the word "directly" been
inserted immediately before the word "employed" in each of the two
quoted sentences. But the legislative history supplies the necessary clarification:
The Committee has also recognized the need for special provisions to deal
with a case where a longshoreman or ship builder or repairman is employed directly by the vessel. In such case, notwithstanding the fact that
the vessel is the employer, the Supreme Court in Reed . . . and Jackson
• . . held that the unseaworthiness remedy is available to the injured
employee. The Committee believes that the rights of an injured longshoreman or ship builder or repairman should not depend on whether he was
employed directly by the vessel or by an independent contractor. Accordingly, the bill provides in the case of a longshoreman who is employed
directly by the vessel there will be no action for damages if the injury was
caused by the negligence of persons engaged in performing longshoring
services. Similar provisions are applicable to ship building or repair employees employed directly by the vessel. The Committee's intent is that
the same principles should apply in determining liability of the vessel
which employs its own longshoremen or ship builders or repairmen as
apply when an independent contractor employs such persons."
While there are two decisions of federal district courts mistakenly reading
the 1972 amendments as overruling the result of Reed and Jackson,4 7 the
144. Subsection 902(21) of the 1972 Longshoremen's Act states: "[Tlhe term 'vessel'
means any vessel upon which or in connection with which any person entitled to benefits
under this chapter suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his employment,
and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent operator, charter or bare boat charterer,
master, officer, or crew member." Hence, the act uses the term "vessel" in the same sense
that this article used the term "shipowner." See text following note 1, supra.
The term "charter" in the enumeration of the entities included within the "vessel" defintion is rather obviously "clerical misprision". Rivera v. Maritime Fruit Carriers Co., 1974
A.M.C. 1951, 1953 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1974). The decisions are sensibly reading that term to
refer to a time character. See Rivera; Standard Fruit Co. v. Metropolitan Stevedoring Co.,
1976 A.M.C. 196 (Cal. App. 1975).
145. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976).
146. S. REP. 11-12; H.R. REP. 4705.
147. Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 384 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd,
521 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, __ U.S. -,
96 S. Ct. 785 (1976); Smith v. MYV
Captain Fred, Nos. 74-599, 75-389 (E.D. La., Feb. 8, 1975). The Captain Fred case was

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

other decisions are unanimous in holding, in accordance with the express
intention of the committee reports, that the shipowner/stevedore may be
liable in negligence to the injured longshoreman provided the plaintiff can
establish that the defendant was negligent in some feature of its operations
other than longshoring.' 45 The continued availability of tort recovery
against the shipowner/stevedore can now be said to have been clearly established in the post-1972 cases.' 49
C.

Stevedore's Liability for Contribution or Indemnity to NonShipowners Sued by Longshoremen

Thus far two rather clear effects of the 1972 amendments have been
discussed. It seems reasonably settled that independent contractor stevedores are insulated from all recovery in contribution or indemnity by shipowners. On the other hand, the entity which is both shipowner and stevedore can be liable in tort to the injured employee. A third matter implicated by the amendments is much less clear: whether the stevedore can
be liable for contribution or indemnity to a defendant other than a shipowner who is held liable to an injured longshoreman on account of injuries
occurring in the longshoring operations.
There is no language in the Longshoremen's Act directly dealing with
this question. The new §905(b) forbids any form of recovery over against
stevedores by shipowners,'1" but does not affect the question of recovery
over by other entities.' 5 ' The provisions of §905(a), to the effect that the
scheduled for argument in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 1, 1976. App. No.
75-1910.
In addition to the district court decisions in Griffith and Captain Fred, the new GILMORE
& BLACK treatise, supra note 142, at 450, also takes the view that Congress meant to overrule
Reed and Jackson.
148. Napoli v. [Transpacific Carriers, etc.] Hellenic Lines, 536 F.2d 505, 506-507 (2d Cir.
19761; Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 42-44 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied,
U S___, 96 S. Ct. 785 (1976); White v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 1975 A.M.C. 2301,
2302-2303 (E.D. La. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402,
409 (E.D. La. 1974) (dictum).
149. Griffith, 521 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1975), also reaches the sensible conclusion that, since
the shipowner/stevedore can be sued in tort by the injured longshoreman, he is not immune
from an action for contribution brought by another defendant whom plaintiff has sued. 521
F.2d at 44. The court correctly read Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S.
106 (1974), as standing for the proposition that it is only the employer statutorily immune
from suit by the plaintiff who is immune from an action for contribution. The court also
persuasively read the very recent decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397 (1975), holding that contribution in collision cases is to be determined according to the
relative percentages of negligence of the parties, to mean that contribution in all maritime
cases ought to be according to proportional negligence. That point had been left open in
Cooper, 417 U.S. at 108 n.3.
150. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (1972). See discussion, supra, at notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
151. See Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 410 (E.D. La.

19771

LONGSHOREMEN'S A CT

stevedore's workmen's compensation liability "shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. . .and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer. . .on account
of such injury,"' ' 2 might be read to forbid any indemnity and contribution
actions against stevedores. But the fact that that very language'53 was read
in the Ryan line of cases' 5 1 to permit a form of indemnity against stevedores
militates against that interpretation.
The handful of post-1972 cases in point have exhibited some doubt about
the correct resolution of the stevedore's liability for contribution or indemnity to non-vessel defendants sued by injured longshoremen. The majority of the decisions tend to support the view that indemnity recovery on
the basis of contract is permitted' 5 but that the stevedore cannot be liable
for either contribution or indemnity on the basis of tort principles.' 5 The
reasoning of the decisions is roughly that, with respect to recovery of contractual indemnity, there is nothing in the law to prevent it. On the other
hand, two features of the law point toward forbidding any form of recovery
over under tort principles. First, a literal reading of §905(a) of the Longshoremen's Act would seem to forbid such recovery as included within the
prohibition against any recovery by "anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer on account of such injury."'5 7 While it is true
that the Ryan case held that language did not preclude recovery over under
the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, which was more of a
tort doctrine than a contract doctrine, two of the post-1972 decisions take
the view that there is warrant for reexamination of the intention of that
statutory language in light of the 1972 amendments' explicit overruling of
1974): "Section 905(b) does not deal in any way with this sort of claim, for it treats only claims
based on negligence of a vessel (or its owners) ....
The House Report emphasizes repeatedly
that the 1972 amendments were designed to eliminate indemnity claims by shipowners, and
nowhere are other third party claims referred to." See also Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411
F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat Service, Inc., 403
F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D. La. 1975).
152. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(a) (Supp. 1976). This language was identical to the provisions of
§905 in the pre-1972 statute. 33 U.S.C.A. §905 (1970).
153. See notes 136 and 152, supra, and accompanying text.
154. See discussion at notes 131-135, supra.
155. Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (implied contract);
Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat Service, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1975) (express
contract). Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La. 1974),
left the question open.
156. Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 955-956 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Fitzgerald v.
Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 410-412 (E.D. La. 1974). Brkaric v. Star
Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) is contra. Finding no jurisdiction over
injuries to a covered employee occurring ashore (see discussion at notes 55-76, supra), the
court held that tort indemnity would be available under state law and stated that it probably
would be available under maritime law.
157. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(a) (Supp. 1976).
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the Ryan doctrine.' Congress, it is reasoned, must have intended not only
that Ryan indemnity be foreclosed, but also that §905(a) be reinvested
with full meaning. On that view, all tort recovery against stevedores is
foreclosed by the statutory language. Second, the courts have read Cooper
Stevedoring, Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,'"5 in which the Supreme Court held
that a shipowner could recover tort contribution from a stevedore who was
not the employer of the injured longshoreman and hence was not immune
from suit by plaintiff, to mean that the stevedore is protected against
liability for contribution in those circumstances where he is the employer
and is thus "immune by statute"'6 from suit by the plaintiff.''
With one exception,' 2 the reported cases support the conclusions just
described. Yet, there are few cases, and the matter needs clarifying by the
courts of appeals.
D.

The "Credit" and "Sole Negligence" Arguments

As indicated above, it ought to be completely clear that, aside from the
peculiar situation of the stevedore who is also a shipowner, all forms of tort
recovery against stevedores on account of longshoremen's injuries are foreclosed by the 1972 amendments. The prohibition in §905(b) against any
liability of the stevedore to the shipowner "directly or indirectly"'' 3 should
be fully understood to mean that the negligent shipowner is to bear the full
tort liability to the injured longshoreman, subject only to a diminution by
plaintiff's negligence,' 4 and that there is no way for all or part of that
liability to be shifted on account of any negligence of which the stevedore
may have been guilty.
But such clarity is hard to come by. Some of the decisions and literature
following the 1972 amendments have raised two further issues respecting
the effect of stevedore negligence. First, it has been argued that the injured
longshoreman should recover from the shipowner only if the shipowner's
negligence is the sole negligence. Under this argument, if the stevedore was
also negligent then recovery on behalf of the injured longshoreman would
be foreclosed. This argument which was dismissed as "insubstantial" by
one court of appeals,'6 5 has been rejected in several cases,' and does not
158. See Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 955-956 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Fitzgerald
v. Compania La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 411 (E.D. La. 1974).
159. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
160. Id. at 109.
161. See Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 955-956 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Fitzgerald
v. Compania La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 410-411, (E.D. La. 1974).
162. See discussion of Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., in note 156, supra.
163. 33 U.S.C.A. §905(b) (Supp. 1976).
164. The legislative history makes clear that the longshoremen's negligence action against
the shipowner is subject to the "admiralty concept of comparative negligence." S. REP. 12;
H.R. REP. 4705.
165. Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1975).
166. Marrant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 1976 A.M.C. 504, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Lucas v.
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seem to present a serious issue at the present. There is general agreement
that stevedore negligence is not sufficient to preclude longshoreman recovery.
A more debatable question is whether stevedore negligence should
diminish longshoreman recovery. In the literature concerning the effects of
the 1972 amendments, there has been considerable speculation about the
availability of some form of "credit" in longshoreman-shipowner suits.' 7
Some of the arguments favoring such a credit are quite ingenious. Several
different versions have been urged, but the core proposition in all these
arguments is that the longshoreman's recovery from the shipowner should
be diminished on account of stevedore negligence.
From one point of view, the argument in favor of diminishing the longshoreman's tort recovery because of the stevedore's negligence gains plausibility from the fact that the stevedore (or his compensation carrier) is
entitled, under §933 of the Act' and the accompanying jurisprudence, to
recoup his compensation liability from the tort judgment in favor of the
injured longshoreman. There is some appeal to the argument that it is
inequitable to permit a negligent stevedore to emerge unscathed from the
injury litigation, while casting the shipowner for the entire damages. In
another sense, the existence of the stevedore's right to recoup his compensation liabilities out of the tort judgment cuts against the credit arguments
because the diminution of that right would obviously be a form of "indirect" recovery over by the shipowner against the shipowner, which is prohibited by the express terms of the new §905(b).
The basic credit argument can be seen with sufficient clarity from the
following example. Illustration I indicates the outcome of the matter without any form of credit. Illustration II shows the operation of the simplest
and most appealing of the credit arguments.
Longshoreman-plaintiff: No negligence. Damages $10,000.
Shipowner-tort defendant: 60% negligence.
Stevedore: 40% negligent.
Compensation act benefits paid or owing: $3,500.
I. Longshoreman recovers $10,000 from shipowner. Stevedore
recoups $3500 from the tort judgment. Thus, the longshoreman's
recovery is a total of $10,000, with the shipowner paying it all.
"Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
167. See Coleman and Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment of Damages According to
Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972 Amendments to Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers 'Act, 35 MARYLAND L. REV. 351 (1976); Shorter, In the Wake of the 1972Amendments
to the L.&H.W.C.A., 7 J. MAR. L. 671 (1976); Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in TripartiteIndustrialAccident Litigation, 19 N.Y. L.F. 587 (1974); Vickery,
Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INS. C.J. 63, 66-67 (1974).
168. 33 U.S.C.A. §933 (Supp. 1976).
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II. Longshoreman recovers $6000 from shipowner. Stevedore
loses his right to recover compensation. Thus, the longshoreman's
recovery is a total of $9500, with the stevedore bearing a fair share
of that cost.
The basic argument for credit is that it is equitable. The detriment to the
longshoreman, it is urged, is one of the prices he pays for the increased
compensation act benefits given by the 1972 amendments. The stevedore
is not escaping scot free, but is bearing a liability roughly in proportion to
his negligence. The co-negligent shipowner is not paying the entire judgment, but is being permitted to share the liability with the co-negligent
stevedore in a sensible fashion.
Despite the appeal of some of the arguments for credit, the reported
decisions are solidly against its availability.6 9 Perhaps the clearest discussion of the matter occurred in Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Tokyo,"7 in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made two
salient points: (1) cutting off or diminishing the stevedore's right to recoupment of compensation liabilities "would be another form of contribution, which the Act seeks to prohibit;"'' and (2) diminishing plaintiff's net
recovery because of the stevedore's negligence imposes "unjustified burdens upon the injured longshoreman."'' 2 Expressly recognizing the shipowner's inequity argument as a plausible one, the court nevertheless refused to "shift the inequity"'7 3 from shipowner to plaintiff. Underlying the
courts' resolution of the credit question seems to be the view that the threeparty compensation scheme envisioned by the 1972 amendments ought to
be kept relatively simple. Additionally, several decisions have indicated a
view that, given the intricacies of a three-party injury system, "it is for the
Congress and not for the courts to create a solution to this problem.""'
IV.

CONCLUSION

It was some time after the effective date of the 1972 amendments before
169. Shellman v. U.S. Lines Operators, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'g 1975
A.M.C. 362 (C.D. Calif. 1974), cert. denied, U.S. __, 96 S.Ct. 1668 (1976); Dodge v.
Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), affg 1975 A.M.C. 1505 (D.
Ore. 1974), cert. denied, U.S. -,
96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976); Santino v. Liberian Distance
Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Hubbard v. Great Pacific Shipping Co.,
404 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Ore. 1975); Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera, S.A., 399 F. Supp.
712 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Croshaw v. Koninslijke Nedlloyd, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975);
Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
170. 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. -. , 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
171. 528 F.2d at 673.
172. Id. at 672.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., 528 F.2d at 673; Santino v. Liberian Distance Transports, Inc., 405 F. Supp.
34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
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the flow of jurisprudence based on those provisions began. " 5 Thus, it is not
surprising or alarming that a number of issues remain unsettled at this
writing.'76 Still, the dominant impression is that much clarifying work
remains to be done.
In the jurisdiction area, there are two major unsettled questions: (1)
whether admiralty's tort jurisdiction has been expanded to include suits
against shipowners by all the longshoremen who are covered for compensation purposes by the amended Act;" 7 (2) whether longshoremen are covered for compensation purposes during the entire loading/unloading operation, 71 or only between the first (or last) "point of rest"'' 9 and the vessel.'1
On the question of the content of the longshoreman's negligence action
against the shipowner, the largest unsettled area is the proper effect of the
legislative history's call for reference to "land-based"'' occupiers' liability
principles.""2 Two decisions presently scheduled for argument before the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 1, 1976, may well shed light
on this area. 83 The most troublesome question within the "land-based"
area-the thrust of the "open and obvious" doctrine-"' is heavily implicated in one of those cases.8 5
While fully definitive answers have not been given, solutions to some of
the other questions raised by the amendments are emerging with more
clarity. It seems to be coming clear that the stevedore/shipowner is subject
to a tort action brought by his longshoreman-employee. 8 Since that particular employer is not statutorily immune from a tort suit by his employee, he can also be liable for contribution to other defendants sued by
175. The first reported decision under the amendments appears to have been Hite v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 375 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. La. 1974). Meanwhile, the courts continue
to be confronted with cases based on pre-amendment facts, turning on constructions of the
pre-1972 Act. In several such cases the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has wistfully stated
that the particular case is "perhaps ...
the last [such case] we shall be called on to
consider." Howell v. Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, S.A., 536 F.2d 1032, 1033 n.1 (5th Cir.
1976); Leblanc v. Two R. Drilling Co., 527 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th Cir. 1976).
176. This article was completed on September 8, 1976.
177. See notes 49-76, supra, and accompanying text.
178. See Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 4 B.R.B.S. 156 (2d Cir., July 1, 1976).
179. I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975).
180. See notes 17-48, supra, and accompanying text.
181. S.REP. at 10; H.R. REP. at 4703.
182. See notes 80-130, supra, and accompanying text.
183. Guerra v. A/S, D/S Laly, No. 73-H-1559 (S.D. Tex., March 10, 1975), App. No. 752441; Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., No. 74-1443 (S.D. Fla., March 21, 1975), App.
No. 75-2729.
184. See notes 100-130, supra, and accompanying text.
185. No. 73-H-1559 (S.D. Tex., March 10, 1975).
186. See notes 140-149, supra, and accompanying text. It should be noted that this issue
is at the core of Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, Nos. 74-599, 75-839 (E.D. La., Feb. 8, 1975),
App. No. 75-1910, scheduled for argument before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on
November 1, 1976.

546

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

the employee." 7 Otherwise, the stevedore is fully insulated from all actions
for contribution or indemnity brought by shipowners, 8 and from all such
actions-save, perhaps, contractual indemnity suits-brought by entities
other than shipowners." 9 Finally, the statutory prohibition against any
form of recovery over, direct or indirect, by shipowners against stevedores
is being interpreted to forbid any form of diminution of the longshoreman's
tort recovery against the shipowner on account of stevedore's negligence. 90
187.
188.
189.
190.

See
See
See
See

note 149, supra.
notes 136-139, supra, and accompanying text.
notes 150-162, supra, and accompanying text.
notes 163-174, supra, and accompanying text.

